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MANAGEMENT SCIENCE — HOW 
GOES ITS PHILOSOPHY ? 
J. W. HOWARD 
THE LEGITIMACY OF MANAGEMENT AS A SCIENCE 
Should we take seriously the idea that management is, or can be a 
science or is the notion mostly so much impressive talk ? Or does it 
matter ? Apparently more and more managers think it does. 
To assert that management is now a science because in organiza-
tions there is a certain realized cohérence in the structural arrangement 
of technologies spun off from the natural and social sciences is hardly 
a sufficient base for the claim, although it may be an adjunctive argument. 
There is very much less merit in the claim to membership in the science 
club on the basis of comparable achievements of status value. That would 
hardly be a pertinent reason, no matter how bolstered. 
We hâve a science when there is compréhension of why tested pro-
positions seem to be true or false at the time and going with this an 
active and maintained attitude toward increasing a body of knowledge 
through the relational structuring of information. Science is what scien-
tists do when they are working at it. They do a great variety of things 
and in ways which reflect their theoretical and methodological biases. 
In proportion to the effectiveness of a man's systematic approaches and 
the degree of convincingness of his arguments and validated findings to 
members of his peer group he may be accorded rank within the scientific 
hierarchy. 
Surely much of ail this goes on within management, even if a good 
deal of that individual managers do is loosely integrated with over-riding 
viewpoints and some of his tasks are carried out in a routine fashion. 
It is neither misleading nor egotistical to lay claim to management as a 
science, albeit one which présents spécial developmental difficulties and 
appears to rest on philosophical premises which are unnecessarily restricted. 
SOME DIFFICULTIES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANAGEMENT 
AS A SCIENCE 
There are three obvious, but related, areas of difficulty for manage-
ments development as a science. First, the facilities for the testing of 
hypothèses are, for the most part, restricted to circumstances which are 
tied to the on-going procédures of the organization. This makes it difficult, 
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if not impossible, to control some variables in the way and to the extent 
considered essential for testing in most of our older sciences. Opinions 
keep intruding as forms of évidence, as well as theory modification, as 
research and expérimentation on even minor aspects go on. This limits 
précise validation or invalidation, but it does not necessarily negate the 
findings. Indeed, there can often be some side advantages. 
While it may sometimes be feasible to withdraw projects and subject 
them to expérimentation in circumstances analagous to a laboratory, this 
approach cannot be made generally applicable to the great bulk of ideas 
and projected changes which appear to hâve merit on the basis of spécu-
lation and limited discussion. The laboratory approach, when it can be 
used, cuts down markedly on possible loss in both money and personal 
réputations. The bets are not so shattering to lose. 
The second area of difficulty makes its appearance when it seems 
necessary, or is thought désirable, to borrow the récent findings of other 
sciences, or technologies developed from them, and fit them into the 
organizational structure in a systematic and well-integrated fashion. This 
impinges on various aspects of innovation, formulation and achievement 
of objectives and the approach to making décisions. Although very ne-
cessary to consider, the « hows » are apt to came to vastly outweight and 
take precedence over the « whys ». To the extent that this is allowed to 
happen the scientific aspect of management sinks to a lower level. At 
this point it is easy to move on to dictating what everyone should do on 
the basis of « this is the way things really are ». 
The third area of difficulty has to do more directly and specifically 
with people. There is little that managers do which is not pertinent to 
the lives of others, either within or outside the organization. With the 
possible exception of éducation, there may presently be no more potent 
human activity than management in influencing social viewpoints. Each 
strives to deal with man in terms of the most widely accepted brands of 
psychology. Thèse présent him as a tabula rasa on which past stimuli and 
their résultant responses hâve left their imprints. In more engineering 
language his behaviour is described in terms of input, output and feed-
back, or in psychological terms of antécédent, conséquent and intervening 
variables. Learning theory, often considered particularly important to 
management from the training standpoint, rests its case on the same kind 
of narrowly realistic, efficient cause description of behaviour, Le., the 
antécédent-conséquent construct basic to much of early natural science 
development. Now somewhat out of date physics made its initial progress 
on the kind of philosophical restrictiveness that marks the bulk of the 
psychology which has gained wide acceptance in both management and 
éducation. 
Many terms hâve been adopted in the vain hopes of broadening 
explanation of efficient causation when applied to the affairs of people. 
Terms such as drives, needs, reinforcements. conditionings, motivations 
and rewards versus punishments ail apring from this source. In manage-
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ment circles they are widely believed to be well proven bits of unchanging 
scientific truth. Too bad they can add nothing to the growth of under-
standing between human beings. They do, however, lend an air of pedantic 
respectability to a host of dogmatisms and strengthen the presumed effi-
cacy of managing others by manipulation rather than through extended 
mutual understanding. Moreover, they help to reduce to almost nil the 
possibility of personal choice and responsibility. They are basically down-
grading and often insulting to those thus described. Beyond the joke 
level it is rare to find a man explaining his own actions in this fashion. 
The explanations seem reserved for those who are considered to need 
applied controls whereby someone else's décisions or aspirations may be 
effected. 
Should one admit that individuals hâve freedom of choice about 
what to do and that they set up their own structures of interprétations 
and beliefs about both their personal and social worlds it becomes rela-
tively easy to see how it happens that a man is very likely to décide to 
frustrate attempts to manipulate him, if not immediately then later. Of 
course, he may act in ways which confirm another's outlook which 
coincides with his own anticipations, but he does it to elaborate his own 
understanding of the situation, not because someone else has motivated, 
reinforced or rewarded him, somewhat after the manner of a puppeteer. 
Management subscribing to a strongly deterministic psychology finds 
it difficult to see man as charting his own course or coming up with new 
meanings created through the power of his intellect. He is seen more as 
a victim of circumstances or a happy conjunction and succession of 
stimuli which hâve left their imprinted directions for his actions, direc-
tions he must necessarily follow. His behaviour at any given moment 
must be seen as a dépendent variable, not his own way of testing out a 
predicted trend which looked interesting or to which he attributed im-
portance and about which he has made choices. 
How has it happened that such a narrowly based deterministic psy-
chology has gained and maintained its ascendency ? And are there more 
interesting ways of looking at our fellow man, ways which hopefully 
could lead to increased mutual understanding and descriptions nearer to 
what we often know him to be ? Let us take a rather brief look at some 
of the influences and what we might do about them. 
PHILOSOPHY'S GENERAL RELATIONSHIP TO MANAGERIAL SCIENCE 
Ail sciences are outgrowths of philosophy. They rest at least tem-
porarily on philosophical viewpoints which hâve gained some ascendency 
and wide acceptance over periods of time. The trends of thought from 
the past hâve set présent directions. Depending on the degree of em-
phasis given to some spécifie tendencies rather than to others, unexpected 
limitations hâve arisen in some directions as well as progress and develop-
ment in others. 
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Managers may not be very prone to extensive philosophical discus-
sion. That they are not unaware of its importance, however, is indicated 
by the frequency one listens to or reads a manager's philosophical posi-
tion epitomized in a quotation from one of his favourite authors or 
authorities. Apparently each assumes that his audience will be aware of 
the quotation's broader implications and their relationships to the sélec-
tion of some immediately pressing problems. The stance is somewhat as 
follows : « Philosophy is important, but time is of the essence and more 
practical affairs should not hâve to wait for too much spéculation on 
why we hâve corne to look at them as we do. » That is one direction 
in which we may keep on facing consistently, but we would certainly 
broaden our horizons if we turned more frequently to a considération 
of the roads by which we hâve arrived where we are and the choices of 
paths we could construct leading to where we may want to go. Much of 
the knowledge for this we already hâve at hand, much more is in the 
libraries for the digging out and some more we may create. It is advo-
cated that managers make the effort and take the time to become much 
more explicit and expansive than they frequently are in expounding the 
underpinnings of their science. It could help lead to the better charting 
of well informed courses than does the placing of the main emphasis on 
minute examination of events of the immédiate past and the calculation 
of the statistical probabilities of their reoccurrence, useful as the latter 
may be on occasion. To the extent that a man knows and understands 
the ebb and flow of past trends of thought he may be venturesome and 
less afraid of the rapidly appearing changes which are said to threaten so 
many. Indeed he may take a more active and assurred part in the making 
of some thèse changes. 
SOME EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL THINKING STILL INFLUENTIAL 
One of the early Greek arguments of continuing importance revolved 
around the nature of reality. The winners were on the side of the static 
view of matter. While motion was given an honoured place, especially in 
art, it was recognized as an epiphenomenon. It belonged to the idéal 
rather than the hard world of reality. We still follow this lead, which over 
a long period has demonstrated its usefulness through the marked develop-
ments that hâve taken place when forces, and later the concepts of mass, 
time and energy, were applied to account for the actions of otherwise 
static matter. However, hard as we may try it does not at ail well explain 
the thinking and behaviour of people. 
About the same time as the acceptance of matter being static, the 
tripartite conception of man (cognition, connation and affection or 
thought, action and feeling) came to the fore. It has remained with us 
ever since as an assorting device. To some people a very poor compart-
mentalization it has turned out to be. But to those who prefer to explain 
their neighbour in terms of a machine, a computer, a biochemical brew 
or a thunderstorm it cornes in quite handy indeed as back-drop scenery, 
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the action ail the while being attributed to énergie properties acting on 
otherwise static matter. 
Somewhat later the emphasis of the better known Greek philoso-
phers shifted more to problems of the mind, the search for knowledge 
and truth and how they were corne by. Man was seen as reasoning in two 
ways, demonstratively and dialectically. Under a variety of changes in 
terminology he is still so thought of in many quarters. Socrates and Plato 
were the most notable exponents of the dialectic as means of gaining know-
ledge and arriving at truth. 
Socrates' method was to proceed by dialogue, each party taking op-
posite sides on the question at issue. By breaking the proposition down, 
using a questioning procédure to bring out items of knowledge and ar-
riving at a synthesis they were on the way to truth. It was contended that 
any belief or proposition carried within it the seeds of new knowledge. Of 
course, each party to the dialogue must be honestly in search of know-
ledge. With this proper spirit new levels of understanding could be achieved 
through discourse. But no dogmatic or final conclusions were expected 
to be reached. Dialectic was an ongoing, never ending affair. It was rec-
ognized that the method could easily degenerate into a contest in sop-
nistry with the man possessing the greater skill in the rhetoric, or an un-
ethical purpose, appearing to win out, as he does to this day. Of course, 
when discourse takes this turn dialectic sinks to a low level or disappears 
entirely. 
Plato employed the Socratic method but carried the technique to the 
point where it became equated with the power of reason. Truth at the 
highest levels could be reached by pure reason and without recourse to 
the sensés. Moreover, by the right methods, discourse was not needed. 
An individual could do this entirely by himself within the cognitive sphère. 
This is a close relative of our modem notion of a ladder of abstraction. 
It remained for Plato's pupil, Aristotle, to take some opposing viewpoints 
which provided the groundwork for those who ever since hâve felt it ne-
cessary to give the dialectic a less honoured place or even to deny it a 
place at ail. Aristotle's claim that a man must reason syllogistically in either 
the démonstrative or dialectical mode was important. The différence 
being that in démonstration the major premise was known to be true and 
primary while in dialectic the major premise was opinion presumed to 
be true but might not be. Error might arise from several sources but was 
certain when reasoning began from untrue opinion. Aristotle denied that 
ideas could, somewhere in the mind, take off from detachment to the 
sensés, a viewpoint which became a corner stone for some empirical de-
velopments centuries later. He did not, however, deny that dialectical 
reasoning is not very frequently employed nor that it may not lead to 
truth. He put some important finishing touches and organization into 
classical logic which remains, despite some psychological objections, as 
a model to this day. His four causes (efficient, material, formai and 
final) he put forward as essential to the adéquate description of any event. 
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As a realistic scientist he assumed that meaning resided in the object under 
study and it was his task to decipher it at first hand, but without expér-
imentation which might change nature. Although primarily a realist he 
described the object under study by the use of ail four causes which led 
him to look for, and find, intentions and purposes in inanimate objects. 
Naturally this led to difficulties in later centuries for some who tried to 
build on this pioneer scientist's prescriptions. 
Aristotle's works were unavailable for a considérable period during 
which the Latin Church was using those of Plato and Socrates. The arrivai 
of translations of Aristotle, via the Arabians, heralded the advancement 
of and considérable changes in theological philosophy. We need not dwell 
on this period, although it left many important influences. 
EMPIRICISM AND THE DOWN-GRADING OF THE DIALECTIC 
From the sixteenth into the eighteenth centuries we had the develop-
ment of the empirical approach which in many ways could be said to hinge 
on « prédiction and control », William Gilbert and Francis Bacon were 
the founders of modem scientific method. They were both concerned 
about man's lot and realized that a more extended and effective use of 
resources was needed. This could corne about gradually with the accu-
mulation of knowledge of reliable prédictions through which controls 
could be effected for practical ends. Thomas Hobbs, John Locke and 
David Hume were the slightly later influentical empiricists. They ail up-
graded the démonstrative, ruled out the dialectic and consigned the formai 
and final causes to use only in the discussion of ethical and aesthetic 
affairs. Apparently thèse were such doubtful and conjectural areas that 
they could be conveniently disregarded. Certainly they were considered 
as having no bearing on science. 
Locke has remained the most influential of this group. His concep-
tion of the mind is one of a passive process, creating nothing, containing 
only what is fed into it through the sensés and with no addition to or sub-
traction from the meanings so collected. However, simple ideas. which 
cannot be broken up, are capable of being combined in a numerical fashion 
to form complex ideas. The frequency of various complex collections 
considered in relation to the sum total of ideas available resuit in a con-
clusion or proposition guiding a course of behaviour. This is the proba-
bility which détermines judgment. In the most complex form it is no 
différent in either nature or convincingness than a simple démonstration. 
Locke could hâve been a pen-pal with a modem cyberneticist. 
Under the circumstances of the times it was necessary for the empiri-
cists to drop much of what they did as being too hamperixig impedimenta 
from the past. It is likely that science could not hâve got off to the start 
it did if it had had to drag along a host of conclusions which at that time 
were assumed to be infallible dérivations from dialectical reasoning and 
those causal descriptions which were most often tied to the dialectical. 
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The most effective way of keeping them out of the way was to déclare 
them non-existent from the standpoint of science. 
Newton's remarkable work and the physics which grew out of it 
gave impetus to the acceptance of the empirical approach in ail areas of 
scientific endeavour. However, since the middle of the last century it has 
been realized that considérable relaxation is necessary if development is 
to continue through the récognition and fostering of creativity and the 
fruitful use of metaphor, analogy, etc. Mapping reality by the exclusive 
use of démonstrative reasoning has corne to be seen as inadéquate in the 
natural sciences. Strangely it has been clung to in académie psychology, 
sometimes to the point of giving the physicists lessons in how they should 
proceed in the good old way. This compliment has been returned by the 
assurance that psychology might be more readily recognized as a full 
fledged science if it portrayed its models of man more idealistically. How-
ever, to do this the behaviourists would hâve to become more flexible 
at moving within some other dimensions, namely : discovery versus in-
vention of abstractions, perspective which meets the requirements of 
the observer versus perspective of the source of the data, objectivity 
versus subjectivity. This is considérable to ask of those confirmed em-
piricists who are uncomfortable with the proposition that man créâtes 
the meanings he places on events and structures the relationships which 
link and extend those meanings. In other words that dialectic might hâve 
a place or use in science. 
At this point we might consider another influence which has helped 
to lower the acceptability of the dialectic, especially during the last seventy 
odd years. Because communism's other name was dialectical materialism 
there has been some added résistance to granting credibility to thinking 
said to be tinged by dialectic. 
Without going into any of the ramifications of either Hegel's or 
Marx's dialectics it is enough to note that Hegel arrived at the point of 
having mind create material, and Marx, by turning Hegel's inside out, 
had material creating mind. They both settled upon the way to write his-
tory before it had happened and Marx prophesized économie develop-
ments which are not happening, nor apparently about to. Both Hegel and 
Marx arrived at enormous dogmatisms, stated as « facts ». This was 
contrary to the whole spirit of the dialectic through the âges, a récognition 
that it is an on-going affair, never resting on the lack of further possibi-
lities about things. Marxism falls down badly on that score. Certainly 
management has no need to avoid considération of the importance of the 
dialectic because it has been supposed to be basic to communism. More-
over, it is exceedingly doubtful if communists do any more, or any less, 
dialectical reasoning than do non-communists. It should be noted that 
empiricism has just as strong a hold behind the iron curtain as it has 
hère, in psychology probably a trille more. Pavlov, one of Russia's revered 
scientists, was a pioneer in setting the kind of research stage on which 
our behavioural scientists still perform, entirely empirically. 
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A récent loosening up in the readiness to discuss the pros and cons 
of Marxism has produced in some quarters an exaggeration regarding the 
place of « conflict ». True, in dialectical discourse opposing opinions may 
be said to conflict. But the intention is to corne up with something new 
and créative, not that the conflicts are to eventuate in a victory of one 
side over the other with the victory acclaimed as a synthesis, which of 
course it never is. Occasionally one hears of more conflict being advo-
cated as a good thing in management. Along with this usually goes some 
techniques for gaining the upper hand. This is ail reminiscent of the an-
cient Art of Controversy and has nothing to do with creating new solu-
tions. But it can certainly help create new enemies, hardly something 
needed in most organizations. 
MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND THE DIALECTIC 
It may be a moot question whether the progress made in the approach 
to truth through dialectical reasoning ought more properly to be consi-
dered simply as an increase in mutual understanding. Certainly a synthesis 
arrived at through dialectical discourse implies mutual understanding that 
is ready to move on to further development, not the formulation of a con-
clusion dictated by some facts. An individual carrying out the process 
by himself, whether of prolonged or short duration, arrives at a point 
where he glimpses a new understanding. He has made further sensé of 
the particular situation. 
It ought to be obvious to management that mutual understanding, 
even without much mutual agreement, requires continuing cultivation in 
ail areas where stresses may arise in interpersonal relationships. The 
greater the lack of personal mutual understanding the more difficult it 
becomes to get mutual agreement on the application of even those bits 
of factual information which pertain to inanimate material. When there 
is also wide mutual disagreement social interaction in that part of the 
organization becomes relatively unpredictable. The fostering of mutual 
understanding at ail levels is a purely dialectical process and cannot be 
attained, or even minimally sustained, by applying bits of cure to the sta-
tistically predicted areas of difficulty, more particularly when the bits of 
cure are also selected from findings based on frequency probability. Thèse 
are too often nothing more than « affirmations of the conséquents » from 
which no logical developments are possible. However, this long used me-
thod has resulted in an immense accumulation of poorly related bits and 
pièces which are put forward as « how to do it /> prescriptions in manage-
ment training and so-called development. It is ail a sadly one-sided ap-
proach to understanding the other fellow. Hopefully, management devel-
opment may one day proceed on the assumption that understanding is 
a two-way street, not the enhancement of a managers facility in catego-
rizing others and expanding redundancies spawned from a deterministic 
psychology, e.g., needs, drives, motivations, etc. Thèse are excellent ways 
of evading or shifting many personal responsibilities, hardly a désirable 
improvement aim. 
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DECISION-MAKING AND SOME HUMAN "VALUE" CONCERNS 
Management has a generally good record of progress in décision 
making. This is a form of non-frequency probability use, a logical 
reasoning form applicable in the face of unquantified, unquantifiable or 
partially quantified materials. In its formai sensé it stems from Leibnitz 
and has definite dialectical aspects. A large proportion of management 
problems are coped with at some stage by this means, whether formally 
or informally applied. The immensely useful computer and the démon-
strative restrictiveness of the Second Law of Thermodynamics as applied 
in organization theory to human activities can never match in convinc-
ingness (or in the generative function of logically weighing propositions 
against each other) the developed relationships which extend meaning 
through the process of décision making. It fits in well with man's on-
going business of elaborating the sensé he makes of his world, his search 
for meaning through expérience. 
We return now to some other features of human concern which the 
empericists hâve declared irrelevant to science, per se. Thèse hâve to 
do with such things as purposes, intentions, aspects of personal responsi-
bility and goals. Thèse ail hâve a forward looking expectancy about them 
and are best described in final cause terms. That is, they embrace ail 
those things « for the sake of which » men behave. Values, with their 
attendant ethical and aesthetic backgrounds, are over-riding hère. Ma-
nagers are never unaware of thèse things and only tend to minimize their 
importance under the influence of the prévalent « antécédent-conséquent » 
over-emphasis. Despite this they remain indispensable for the création of 
each man's image of himself, his contributions to innovations and plan-
ning, his setting of personal objectives, his limitations in cooperativeness 
and his initiative and decisiveness. They are basic to much of the progress 
that can be made in mutual understanding, which is surely one thing 
management can do with more of. Behavioural psychology has nothing 
to contribute hère except the statistical relationships of sequential cause-
effect events. It would leave man as the victim of his biography and 
possibly of those who may later succeed in manipulating him for a time. 
CORRESPONDENCE AND COHERENCE THEORIES OF TRUTH 
Is there a différence in the kind of truth men seek via the démon-
strative and the dialectic? In a certain sensé, yes. The correspondent 
theory of truth would accept as truth that which could be pointed to as 
having worked operationally, which has yielded correct prédictions about 
material things. In brief, truth is what fits the facts and we corne by our 
facts via démonstration. The cohérence theory of truth places its emphasis 
on how an item of knowledge is consistent with and can remain united 
with the larger connection of existing knowledge. Truth hère is what is 
understood, the sensé which is made of an item or a proposition in terms 
of its relationships. This is the dialectic in action. In the strict sensé of 
the term, facts are not arrived at via dialectic, only understanding, but 
250 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 30, NO 2 
one may expound his understanding at a point as if it were factual in 
the correspondence theory sensé. Man has always had this choice of 
whether to continue to extend his understanding or stop and announce 
his discovery of presumed truth, then may be proceed to défend it sophis-
tically. The chances of having things turn out badly by makïng bad 
choices has always been with us and likely always will. 
But are we better off by following only the straight and narrow 
path of empirical righteousness ? Not at ail. One of the most widely over-
looked items of our présent viewpoint is the frequency with which facts 
get shot down but require time to give up the ghost. Quite contrary to 
popular opinion facts do not last in the consistent and permanent form 
in which they are so often dogmatically expressed. There is also the 
matter of the context in which they originated and later are otherwise 
placed. The realist finds it particularly difficult to accept that ail facts 
are subject to alternative constructions. 
A COUNTER-BALANCE TO UNDUE RELIANCE ON EMPIRICISM 
We need in management more awareness of the use of the dialectic 
in order to raise understanding of, and so be able to cope with, those 
features which especially hâve to do with human problems and inter-
relationships. Instead of sticking so doggedly to behavioural psychology 
we may turn to clinical psychology, some branches of which open roads 
to mutual understanding of a nature which would help counterbalance 
the présent excessive reliance upon the empirical outlook. The branch of 
clinical psychology which at présent seems to hâve the balance of features 
which might be most helpful to management science development is 
Personal Construct Theory. Let us note a few of its most salient features. 
Personal Construct Theory rests on the philosophical position of 
constructive alternativism. This assumes that ail events are subject to a 
great variety of constructions, although this is not to say that any one 
construction is as good as another. Ail perceptions remain open to ques-
tion. While the importance of events is stressed it is up to man to place 
meanings on them. Thèse meanings are anchored in the past, are dis-
played mainly in the dimension of time and include anticipated outcomes. 
This is opposed to the implicit proposition of behaviouristic theory that 
meanings are rehersals of outcomes, or its ethical implication that the 
ends justify the means. Man invents the meanings he places on an event 
as well as the linkages and relationships established with the constructions 
of other events. Thus he is basically responsable for the way his thinking 
takes him. He cannot shift the responsibility for conclusions to facts said 
to represent circumstances. This position ties in well with the dialectic, 
but gives a place to démonstration on a plane raised above its usual 
extrême realism. 
A theory of man which is supported by the philosophical point of 
view briefly outlined above must of necessity be an anticipatory one. 
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The usual reactive theory has no place for the venturesome, seeking, 
curious aspects of man nor the intentions which he is forever forming 
and sometimes carrying out. Only an anticipatory theory lets us get away 
from envisaging a person as a purely responding organism, which is 
how the reactive théories project him. Personal construct theory is not 
easy to grasp in ail the possibilités which it has opened up, but there 
are enough well explicated ones to keep us busy for quite some time to 
corne. Basically, it has been succinctly expressed as follows : « A person 
lives his life by reaching out for what cornes next and the only channels 
he has for reaching are the personal constructions he is able to place 
upon what may actually be happening ». This leaves no place for those 
énergie factors, either internai or external, which are required by reactive 
théories to account for man's actions in kind, magnitude and direction. 
The sensé that a person makes of his world and of himself, what he 
does to extend his understanding and rectify the errors he finds he has 
made are ail accomplished, in his own unique way, by applying those 
appropriate portions of his linked and related structure of constructs, 
which he has himself invented for the purpose. They are not given to 
him by events nor found lying around for the picking up. Moreover, 
he behaves to test out the validity of his constructions as well as to make 
some things happen which he has predicted. He behaves in accordance 
with his own choices, not because he has been prodded in certain ways 
or places. One should not confuse this theory with those in effect in most 
forms of sensitivity training. 
We speak of personal constructs because the person himself invents 
them in his own way. A construct is a dicotomous abstraction or référ-
ence axis. It is two-ended thing, real when in use, and is a way in which 
an event is understood by its likenesses and relevant différences to those 
of other events which hâve been already associated and differentiated 
in regard to a certain aspect. Anything is understood in terms of both 
its similarity to some other things and its oppositeness or contrast to 
something else. When expressing a construct in words we most frequently 
leave the contrasting end to be inferred. When the listener happens to 
infer something différent than was expected one may see why he may 
not fully understand what is meant. This sort of thing frequently happens. 
We can act only within the pathways of the net-work or structure 
of constructs we ourselves hâve created. The structure is one of related 
meanings outside of which we do not hâve choices. 
An important feature of construct theory is that at the very basis 
of our thinking meaning starts with both similarity and opposition at 
the same time. Meaning is extended through linkage and construed rela-
tionships with some other constructs within the changing structure. Thus 
dialectic is extended down to the process of the construction one places 
on a bit of reality of whatever sort. 
The above is intended only to point out a few of the ways in which 
construct theory differs from the usual behavioristic théories applied in 
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the majority of organizations. Neither has any attempt been made to 
illustrate techniques arising from the theory. The over-riding purpose 
has been to indicate a feasible alternative which could help broaden the 
philosophical base of management science and be of some practical as-
sistance in reducing the spécial developmental difficulties which it appears 
to labour under. Much of ail this hinges on the broad problem of increas-
ing mutual understanding, which can never be static or couched in terms 
of finality. And neither should management. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
ADLER, M.J., Dialectic, New York, Harcourt Brace & Co., 1927. 
BANNISTER, D. & J.M.M. MAIR, The Evaluation of Personnel Construis, Lon-
don & New York, Académie Press, 1968. 
BANNISTER, D. et al., Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory, London & New 
York, Académie Press, 1970. 
BANNISTER, D. & F. FRANSELLA, Inquiring Man, London & New York, Pen-
guin Books Ltd. 
KELLY, George A., The Psychology of Personal Constructs, New York, W.W. 
Norton, 1955, vols I & IL 
MAHER, B., Clinical Psychology and Personality (The selected papers of George 
Kelly), London & New York, John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
OPPENHEIMER, J. Robt, « Analogy in Science», American Psychologist, 1956, 
vol. II, pp. 127-135. 
POPPER, K.R., The Poverty of Historicism, London, Routlege & Keegan Paul, 
1957. 
POPPER, K.R., The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson. 
RUSSELL, B., Wisdom of the West, Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1959. 
RUSSELL, B., An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, London, George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd., 1940. 
RYCHLAK, J.F., A Philosophy of Science for Personality Theory, Boston, Mass., 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1968. 
